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et al.: Book Review

Book Reviews
LisTEN To LEADERS IN LAW. Edited by Albert Love and James Saxon Childers.
New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1963. Pp. xii, 332. $4.75.
This book is one of a series in which the editors, following an idea repeatedly
advanced by college students contemplating careers, that they would like to
talk to the "big men" in a field, have undertaken to have leaders in various fields
tell of their experiences, answer questions, and give advice and guidance to those
contemplating a career in business or a profession.
The tone for this particular volume on law is set by Mr. Justice Frankfurter's
introductory chapter. In a chatty style, he mentions some of his experiences as a
student and teacher at Harvard, points out the versatility of legal training and
discusses the qualities a lawyer needs. Following this introduction, Dean Griswold
writes about prelegal and legal education, law schools and opportunities for the
law trained person, and includes a helpful bibliography of books about law. Then,
Dillon Anderson has a piece about what a law firm expects of a beginning lawyer,
with a priceless story about a lawyer who did not like people (he became a drama
critic). One lawyer (John V. Hunter III, from a "medium-sized Southern town"),
writes about beginning law practice, and there are chapters on practice in a large
city (by Whitney North Seymour) and in a small community (by Judge Peter
Woodbury), with the former pointing to the wide variety of professional challenges
in the city and the latter concluding that the choice depends on whether one enjoys mainly dealing with people as individuals or with legal issues. There is considerable agreement on what are the differences in the practice in the varied settings.
There are also a number of chapters dealing with the lawyer in trial work, as
a specialist and in public legal office. Edward Bennett Williams gives some helpful
advice on trying cases and comments on the importance of criminal procedure and
the desirability of extending to criminal causes the discovery methods now available in civil proceedings, a point which Mr. Justice Brennan made in greater detail in his 1963 Tyrrell Williams Lecture.' Edward Silver comments on the lawyer
as district attorney, noting his power. The lawyer in Corporate, International and
Labor Law is the subject of discussions by, respectively, Paul Carrington, Judge
Philip C. Jessup, and Mr. Justice Goldberg, the latter two making the point that
one must first be a lawyer before he can be a specialist. A chapter on the lawyer
in government (by John K. Carlock) is followed by two interesting, largely autobiographical, sketches by Florence M. Kelley, a successful woman lawyer and
judge, and by Harrison Tweed. Justice Walter V. Schaefer writes on the lawyer as
judge, the importance of his job in this country and the attraction the position holds
1. Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth,
1963 Wash. U. L. Q. 279.

(248)
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for lawyers. The book concludes with a letter from a lawyer (Herman Phleger) to
his son on his entering practice.
The editors of this book have succeeded in their aim to let leaders in law
"talk" to the readers. There are differing viewpoints, of course, and some overlapping, as one might expect in a book of this sort, but there is general unanimity
on the ideals of the profession. And clearly one can say that the authors are all
dedicated lawyers, with a sense of pride in the profession and a belief in its value
to society. The book gives a good cross-sectional view of the legal profession at
work. It should be particularly helpful to students who are trying to determine
whether they want to enter upon the study of law and to those who are ready to
commence the practice.
HIRAM H. LEs~Au*

By David Mellinkoff. Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 196 . Pp. xiv, 526. $12.50.

THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW.

The ambitious aim of this interesting book is to tell "what the language of the
law is, how it got that way, and how it works out in the practice.", ±
Naturally the point of departure is a definition of the subject and title of the
book. What is the language of the law? A ten page "expanded" definition apprises
the reader that the language of the law is ". . . a convenient label for a speech pattern with a separate identity," 2 ". . . the customary language used by lawyers in

those common law jurisdictions where English is the official language,"s although
the language of the law is not officially English." 4 While noting that the
language of the law is condemned for its frequent use of "weasel words," Mr.
Mellinkoff unfortunately fails to dispose of the weasel in his selected topic: language
of the law. The ten page definition offers no criterion for delineating "the law"
from non-law. Abstractions are often expedient, indeed ".

..

every department of

intellectual activity including law would be slowed down almost to a standstill
if we did not employ shorthand expressions to denote great masses of related
facts." 8 However, the uncritical use of an abstract term, such as "law," generates
profound confusion and unnecessary problems, often by reifying or objectifying
concepts or confusing levels of abstraction7 The only definition of "the law"
*Dean and Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law.
1. MELLINKOFF, Preface to THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW viii (1963) [hereinafter cited as L.L.]
2. Id. at 3.
3. Ibid.
4. Id. at 10.
5. CHAsE, THE TYRANNY OF WORDS 324 (1938), cited in L.L. at 21.

6. Chafee, The Disorderly Conduct of Words, 41 CoLum. L. REv. 381, 391
(1941).
7. This of course is one of the dangers inherent in the subject-predicate form
abjured by, among others, Korzybski, Russell and Chase. See KoRZBsKI, SCIENCE
AND SANrrY (1933); RUSSELL, OUtR KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXTERNAL WoRLD 42 (2d
ed. 1929); CHAsE, THE TYRANNY OF WoRDs (1938); Probert, Law, Logic and Cornmunication, 9 W. REs. L. Rnv. 129 (1958).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol29/iss2/10
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offered to the reader appears to reflect such an uncritical use: "The law is a profession of words." s Clearly "the law" is administered by professionals who employ
words, and just as clearly it is not a profession of words. This is not the first instance of inappropriate application of the subject-predicate form to the law, nor
will it be the last., Although the "law" may have no precise meaning,o the salient
elements of the "law" can be identified by most educated persons.11 Therefore Mr.
Mellinkoff might plausibly respond that most readers will understand what he
means, and, after all, he has stated that "the language of the law" is merely a
convenient label.
Is it unreasonable to expect a book on language and law to deal with the problems of meaning involved in the title terms themselves? This is not to suggest
that a definitive treatment of the concepts of law or language is required, but at
the least a recognition of the jurisprudential, semantic and epistemological issues
necessarily presented by the subject matter. Is language ".

.

. a depository of the

accumulated body of experience to which all the former ages have contributed
their part and which is the inheritance of all that is yet to come?"' 12 Is the language of the law a ". . . witness and external deposit of our moral life?"'1 Should
the word pattern of legal propositions fit the pattern of the facts to which the
propositions apply?1 4 Is law, as a language of social agreement, subject to the same
8. L.L. at vii.
9. "We have been told by Plato that law is a form of social control, an instrument of the good life, the way to the discovery of reality, the true reality of
the social structure; by Aristotle that it is a rule of conduct, a contract, an ideal
of reason, a rule of decision, a form of order; by Cicero that it is the agreement of
reason and nature, the distinction between the just and the unjust, a command
or prohibition; by Aquinas that it is an ordinance of reason for the common good,
made by him who has care of the community, and promulgated; by Bacon that
certainty is the prime necessity of law; by Hobbes that law is the command of
the sovereign; by Spinoza that it is a plan of life; by Leibniz that it is a norm
established by the commonwealth; by Hume that it is a body of precepts; by
Kant that it is a harmonizing of wills by means of universal rules in the interests
of freedom; by Fichte that it is a relation between human beings; by Hegel that
it is an unfolding or realizing of the idea of right." CAIRNS, LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
FROM PLATO To HEGEL 556 (1949).
10. 'Ve speak of ourselves as practicing law, as teaching it, as deciding it;
and not one of us can say what law means." CARDOZO, SELECTED WRITINGS 7, 43
(Hall ed. 1947).
11. Hart lists five salient features:
(1) Rules forbidding or enjoining certain types of behaviour under penalty.
(2) Rules requiring people to compensate those whom they injure in certain ways.
(3) Rules specifying what must be done to make wills, contracts, or other
arrangements which confer rights and create obligations.
(4) Courts to determine what the rules are and when they have been
broken.
(5) A legislature to make new rules and abolish old ones. H.L.A. HART,
THE CONCEPT OF LAW 3 (1961).
12. Anshen, Foreword to LANGUAGE: AN ENQUIRY INTO ITS MEANING AND
FUNCTION xvi (Anshen ed. 1957).
13. Holmes, The Pat&of the Law, 10 HARv.L. REv. 457, 459 (1897).
14. For the thesis that all propositions should thus fit see LANGER, PHILOSOPHY
IN A NEw KEY (1942). For a critical analysis of Langer's thesis see NAGEL, LOGIC
WITHOUT METAPHYSICS

354 (1956).
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type of analysis as analytic and synthetic propositions?15 To what extent should
the "law in books," [the "language of the law"?] reflect "law-in-action" or actual
behavior as contradistinguished from the ideals of the community?
Justice Schaefer has remarked that: "It is the lawyer's business to master
words; the risk that the law runs is that they may master him." 16
Will the lawyer master his language if he cannot ask the above and related
questions? I think not, even though complete answers must await development of
"a generalized and systematic theory of language, worked out with attention to
details of application."- Awareness of the questions is one of the first steps in improving lawyers' language.
While knowledge of how legal terminology has developed is no substitute for
an understanding of general semantics, it is nonetheless an invaluable aid to understanding that terminology. Mr. Mellinkoff has succeeded admirably and entertainingly in fulfilling his goal of telling how the language of the law "got that way
and how it works out in the practice." Indeed, Parts II and III offer valuable material for collateral reading in legal drafting and writing courses. A student who
has carefully read the Language of the Law will use language with a greater sensitivity to the risks involved.
Part II of the Language of the Law traces in detail the growth of legal terminology in England and subsequently in the United States. The analysis is conveniently divided into the following catgeories: Chapter V: Before the Normans;
Chapter VI: The Norman Conquest; Chapter VII: The Law and Latin; Chapter
VIII: Some Characteristics of the Middle English Period; Chapter IX: The Rise
and Fall of Law French; Chapter X: Three Centuries of Modern English; Chapter XI: Law Language in America.
"A word," says Whitehead, "has a symbolic association with its own history,
its other meanings, and its general status in current literature."1s The Language
of the Law illustrates this principle to the point of convincing the reader that the
etymology of many legal terms is the key to their meaning. How many times have
15. See Hayakawa, Semantics, Law and "Priestly-Minded Men," 9 W. REs.
L. REv. 176, 177 (1958).
16. Schaefer, Foreword to The Language of the Law-A Symposium, 9 W. REs.
L. REv. 115, 118 (1958).
17. NAGEL, A Philosophy of Language, LoGIC WIroUr METAPHYSICS 347,

348 (1956). "[T~he relations between words and meaning and between words and
things are matters that legal speculation must face in its effort to reach a valid
understanding of the nature and role of law." Cairns, Language of Jurisprudence,
232 (Anshen ed. 1957).
18. WHITEHEAD, SYMB3OLISM: ITS MEANING AND EFFECT 84 (1927). Perhaps
Holmes said it better: "A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is
LANGUAGE: AN ENQUIRY INTO ITS MEANING AND FUNCTION

the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according
to the circumstances and the time in which it is used." Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S.
418, 425 (1918). And Mellinkoff also says it: "[C]ontinuity of the form of words
gives no assurance of continuity of meaning in or out of the law." L.L. at 108. Raymond Williams' analysis of the change in meaning of five terms (industry, democracy, class, art, and culture) provides fascinating documentation for the proposition that the meaning of words is a function of the societal matrix. See WILLIAMS,
CULTURE AND SOCIETY

1780-1950 (1958).
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you read on a diploma or some official document the statement: Know all men
by these Presents? Did you comprehend fully its import?
In Medieval Latin presens scriptum [present writing] was shortened so
that presens would do the work of both words. This shortened form combined with the universal greetings to yield the still-used clause: Know all
men by these Presents."o
Can voir dire have the same meaning for you after reading the following:
In Modern French voire means in truth, but without the e, as voir, the
meaning is to see. A conclusion from Modern French could be that voir
dire means "to see him speak." But the law words voir dire . . .carry
their Old French meaning to speak the truth, the same meaning as Old
French voir dit, which ended in English and Modern French as verdict.
Part II is profusely sprinkled with similar interesting explanations of the how
and why of legal argot: explanations that transmute seemingly irrational terminology into an historically explicable product. Why does the lawyer use two
words when one would do? Why acknowledge and confess? Devise and bequeath?
Breaking and entering? Mellinkoff reports that this doubling was due to the rich
stock of English and French words upon which 15th century English lawyers could
draw for legal terms. Bilingual synonyms were joined for emphasis, clarity, lyrical
effect, or "sometimes in keeping with the bilingual fashion of the day." 20 Exposing
the etiology of the doubling disease enervates the arguments for perpetuating dual
terms which have not achieved the status of terms of art. If the reason for the
existence of a double term, or for that matter any foreign or archaic term, is
solely historical accident, why retain it when ordinary English would achieve
greater understanding? "[T~he language of the law should not be different without
a [valid] reason.' 21 But, if legal terminology is more precise, shorter, more intelligible, or more durable, any one of these attributes may justify the use of what
has been called a foreign language, the argot of the law.22 In Part III the "language
of the law" is contrasted with ordinary language to determine if it is (1) more
precise: Chapter XIII; (2) shorter: Chapter XIV; (3) more intelligible: Chapter
XV; or (4) more durable: Chapter XVI.
What is novel in this section is not the criticisms of legal language, for the
same criticisms have been frequently propounded by the quick and the dead. 3
19. L.L. at 92.
20. Id. at 121.
21. Id. at 285. Holmes was not so concise. "It is revolting to have no better
reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It
is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished
long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past." Holmes,
The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. Ray. 457, 469 (1897).
22. "Only a very few law instructors will tell their students ...that much
of a student's confusion, bewilderment, and frustration arises because he is not
being taught law only-he is being taught a foreign language as well." Hager, Let's
Simplify Legal Language, 32 ROCKY MT. L. Rav. 74, 77 (1960).
23. See 'Lavery, The Language of the Law, 7 A.B.A.J. 277 (1921), 8 A.B.A.J.
269 (1922); Chafee, The Disorderly Conduct of Words, 41 CoLuNT. L. REv. 381
(1941); Williams, Language and the Law, 61 L.Q. REv. 71, 179, 293, 384 (1945),
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1964
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What is novel is the refreshing presentation of the material accompanied by a
wealth of cited cases exemplifying the risk the lawyer takes when he does not
master his language. Lawyers tend to be conservative in their use of language.
Rather than innovate and discard worn out terms such as "malice," "conclusive
presumption,"24 "aforesaid," 25 "and/or," 26 "forthwith,"27 "hereafter," 28 "hereby,"29 "herein,"3 etc., the lawyer retains these instruments of confusion for fear
that their omission will make his language "too plain and simple to be clear and
unambiguous, or so plain and simple as to be devoid of legal meaning, or both.'3a
"That is the fear," cautions Mellinkoff, "that freezes lawyers and their language. It is precise now. We are safe with it now. Leave us alone. Don't change.
Here we stay till death or disbarment."3 2
How tragically true. Senior law students in legal drafting classes perennially
manifest the same symptoms when told to prune the traditional forms.83 We tell
them to do so for conciseness, meaningfulness, precision. 8 ' But the best answer is

62 L.Q. REv. 387 (1946); Curtis, A Better Theory of Legal Interpretation,4 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 321 (1949); The Language of Law-A Symposium, 9 W. RES.
L. REv. 115 (1958); Hager, Let's Simplify Legal Language, 32 ROCKY MT. L. REV.
74 (1960); Mehler, Language Mastery and Legal Training, 6 VILL. L. Ray. 201
(1961).
24. Chafee, Tte Disorderly Conduct of Words, 41 COLUM. L. REv. 381, 393
(1941).
25. L.L. at 305.
26. Id. at 306.
27. Id. at 310.
28. Id. at 312.
29. Id. at 313.
30. Id. at 315.
31. Morton, Challenge Made to Beardsley's Plan for Plain and Simple Legal
Syntax, 16 J.S.B. CALIF. 103, 105 (1941), cited in L.L. at 295.
32. L.L. at 295.
33. The same admonition applies to all forms of symbolism. Whitehead notes:
"[Tlhe symbolic elements in life have a tendency to run wild, like the vegetation
in a tropical forest. The life of humanity can easily be overwhelmed by its symbolic
accessories. A continuous process of pruning, and of adaptation to a future ever requiring new forms of expression, is a necessary function in every society." Whitehead, Op. cit. supra note 18, at 61.
34. A useful device for rational selection of legal terminology is the checklist
of questions set forth in L.L. at 298:
(1) Is it a term of art?
(a) Did I ever learn "law" about this expression?
(b) Are its edges sharp or soft?
(c) Is that the only way it can be used?
(d) Is it used in this instance as a term of art?
(e) Are there other words can serve as well?
(f) Will even slight variation change its legal effect?
(2) Is this the traditionalway of saying it?
(a) Did it ever have a definite meaning?
b) Does it have a definite meaning now?
(c) Does this way make meaning more exact than ordinary English?
(d) Is there any good reason for saying it this way now?
(3) Does precedent support this usage?
(a) Is it decision or dictum?
(b) Is the precedent decisive or persuasive in this jurisdiction?

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol29/iss2/10
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a demonstration that an irrational adherence to the traditional forms often leads
the lawyer "headlong into disaster."3 5 Part III is an excellent demonstration, for
in each instance where particular traditional terminology is criticized, cases are
set forth in which disaster resulted from unthinking use of the term in question.
The law student who has read Part II knows the extent to which a term is the
resultant of historical vectors. In Part III he is shown the danger attendant upon
use of a word when its reason is gone. After a careful analysis of the Language of
the Law a lawyer can never be the same, for he will be aware that it is his jobto know when a reason and a word are done for. It is a steady job, not
ended with yesterday's pleading, today's opinion, nor with this book.
Cleansed of words without reason, much of the language of the law need
not be peculiar at all. And better for it.36
Ovm C. LEwis*

A LAWYER WHEN

NEEDED.

By Elliot Evans Cheatham. New York: The Columbia

University Press, 1963. $14.50.
If you doubt the potential pervasiveness of the legal profession's impact upon
all of men's most significant affairs, you will find in Professor Cheatham's 1963
Carpentier Lectures, here published in book form, abundant evidence affirming the
fundamental nature of the legal profession's role in human events. If you fear
that that influence is slipping, or feel it is being usurped by non-lawyers, you will
find in this book a wholly fair indictment of our profession's failure to rise to the
challenges of new times and to employ creditable and even remunerative ways of
providing services which the public desperately needs.
Professor Cheatham does not overstate the profession's potential, nor his indictment of its failures. On the contrary, his worst fault is his moderation, especially in describing the opportunities which the profession has missed and is still
missing.
It is his thesis that circumstances of social change, enlarging the novelty and
complexity of arenas of human conflict and expanding the role of government and
of various groups in affecting individual affairs, have intensified men's need for
(c)
d)
e)
f)

How fresh is this precedent?
Would it be followed today?
Are there other precedents the other way?
Does it make sense?

(4) Is there some requirement that it be said this way?

(a) What sort of requirement is it-statute, ordinance, rule of court,
administrative order, or something Charley the filing clerk insists upon?
hb) What are the consequences of departure from rote?
c) Has it ever been interpreted?
d Has it been tested-recently?
(e) Would it be enforced today?
35. L.L. at 295.

36. L.L. at 454.
*Assistant Professor of Law, Western Reserve University.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1964
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the aid of "the initiated, the lawyers." Five situations are considered "in which
renewed efforts are essential to meet the need for counsel"--those of the hated,
the poor, the middle classes, clients needing specialized services, and the public
interest. Though he credits the organized bar with having already done much for
two of the five-the hated and the poor-you cannot read this book and your
daily newspaper without feeling that his characterizations of the bar's response
to the other three--"uncertainty on how to meet" the need, "slow and hesitant"actually applies to all.
His lecture on "The Hated" deals with the generic problem, of which the need
of counsel for individuals who have been discriminated against because of race,
or because of their participation in the civil rights movement, is a part. It is a
problem whose characteristics are essentially regional (the problems of providing
counsel for members of minority races in the North and the West are more
properly classified with Professor Cheatham's lecture on "The Poor"), and perhaps for this reason, Professor Cheatham does not give it more than passing
attention.
It is a matter of common knowledge that there are no more than three lawyers
(all of them Negroes) engaged in private practice in the entire State of Mississippi
who are willing to participate in "civil rights" cases. The burden of litigation there,
arising alone from the denial of elementary justice in criminal proceedings and of
rights of speech and assembly to participants in the civil rights movement, far
exceeds the capacity of any three lawyers. Yet for handling such cases these three
have been subjected to harassment from which the organized bar has never provided a refuge.
Comparable problems are to be found in other states of the deep South,
though more lawyers may be available. A dozen or more southern lawyers have
been the victims of acts of official harassment reported in the public press, and perhaps no one knows the extent of unofficial harassment of these and other lawyers
who have dared to take a cause which runs counter to the official consensus in
these states. At least two, William Higgs of Mississippi and Charles Morgan of
Alabama, have felt compelled, and for good reason in each case, to abandon their
practices and to move out of the South. The profession nationally has given but
inadequate attention to its obligation to these lawyers and has yet to find a means
of supplementing the consciences of the few to supply a legal resource for the
needs of the many unpopular litigants in this region. (Many organizations, however, are engaged in intensive efforts to recruit lawyers from outside the region to
fill some of the void.)
In this void the zeal and diligence of lawyers who are assigned to defend persons charged with crime is affected. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, in a habeas corpus case involving systematic exclusion of Negroes
from trial juries, took official cognizance of one aspect of this effect when it said:
, . . Such courageous and unselfish lawyers as find it essential for their
clients' protection to fight against the systematic exclusion of Negroes from
juries sometimes do so at the risk of personal sacrifice which may extend
to loss of practice and social ostracism.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol29/iss2/10
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As Judges of this Circuit comprising six states of the deep South, we think
it is our duty to take judicial notice that lawyers residing in many southern
jurisdictions rarely, almost to the point of never, raise the issue of systematic exclusion of Negroes from juries.,
One may respect Professor Cheatham's disinclination to harp upon a problem
with such regional characteristics, and yet disagree with his failure to include it.
The omissions of the bar in this instance are a part of a pattern of lawlessness, in
the face of social changes of revolutionary import, that may well be expected to
recur in other regions, or even throughout the entire nation, under the stress of
any future issue of comparable intensity. Since the book does deal with the larger
responsibilities of the profession, its role in the functioning of institutions designed
to achieve Freedom Throughr Law2 seems to be significantly relevant.
Especially in his lectures on the middle classes, the need for specialized services and the need for representation of the public interest, Professor Cheatham exhibits breadth in his conception of the legal profession's potential. In "The Middle
Classes" he describes the conflicts which arise between reasonable efforts to fulfill unmet needs and the application of accepted professional standards (prohibiting the intervention of lay intermediaries, the solicitation of work for lawyers, and
the representation of individual members of a group by a lawyer retained by the
group as an entity). He does not shrink from facing the evils these standards are
designed to control, but exhibits ingenuity and imaginativeness in proposing that
their application be limited to the situation in which these evils inhere and not to
inhibiting opportunities for enlarging the capacity of the profession to serve the
public.
In "The Public Interest" he relates the uniqueness of the extraordinary American "facility for casting social, economic, philosophical and political questions in
the forms of action at law and suits in equity," 8 and describes some twentieth
century innovations adopted to insure representation of a public interest in the
resolution of some of these litigated social questions. Thus the participation of
counsel for two municipalities, and of the state's attorney general (all as parties)
and, on appeal, of the Solicitor General of the United States (as amicus curiae)
in the legislative reapportionment case of Baker v. Carr' reflected the representation of different group or public interests in a privately initiated law suit.
But he outlines unresolved problems of public representation in the settlement of questions commonly dealt with as private, which do have an impact upon
the public interests (or on those of groups within the public), in which such interests are not now represented. For instance, the public interest is usually unrepresented, or under-represented, in the negotiation as well as the litigation of
issues of labor-management relations, most vulnerably when industry-wide bar1. United States ex rel. Goldsby v. Harpole, 263 F.2d 71, 82 (5th Cir. 1959).
2. The title of Professor Robert Hale's book, quoted in this context in Professor Cheatham's last lecture.
3. Cox, The Nature of Supreme Court Litigation, 45 J. AM. JuD. Soc. 93, 94
(1961), quoted by Professor Cheatham on page 106.
4. 179 F. Supp. 824 (M.D. Tenn. 1959), rev'd, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1964

9

19641

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [1964], Art. 10

BOOK REVIEWS

gaining occurs. Professor Cheatham, in addition, interestingly employs the example of the public interest in the welfare of children who are the subject of a custody
stipulation between their litigating parents. In far more ways than we usually
acknowledge, non-public bodies and private individuals (corporations, labor unions,
colleges and universities, and parents) "make law" binding themselves but affecting others who are not represented in the process.
Professor Cheatham points out that his lectures concern what economics
would have treated as the problems of distribution, as distinct from the problems
of production. He proposes that the legal profession give to matters affecting the
availability of its services attention comparable to that which it has accorded with
such good effect to the quality of those services. The gap he describes between the
public's need for the work of lawyers and its availability is large indeed. (With
respect to one particular dereliction of the legal profession, I have suggested it is in
fact much larger than Professor Cheatham's temperate treatment emphasizes.) His
call for lawyer-like creativeness and ingenuity to close the gap deserves careful heed.
JOHN DE J. PEMBERTON, JR.*

*Executive Director, American Civil Liberties Union,
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol29/iss2/10
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